it by using an appropriate tax policy or by directly imposing a cap on the proportion of jobs that can be sent abroad to offshore firms.
The economic and political concerns about unemployment and income fragility must be balanced against the need to ensure productivity growth. The deep post-2008 financial and economic crisis may have permanently reduced the production capacity of industrialized countries by as much as 4 percent (Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 2009, and Furceri and Mourougane, 2009 ), such that a rapid rise in productivity growth might be the only (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) impact on productivity growth in the U.S., but the impact of servicing outsourcing was much greater than the impact of materials outsourcing and accounted for 10 percent of the growth in labor productivity.
Bachmann and Germany Manufacturing and Overall, outsourcing increases job stability, much more so Braun (2011) (1991-2000) services sectors in the services sector than in the manufacturing sector. However, the impact of outsourcing varies by skill level of workers, with medium-skilled and older workers at higher risk of transitioning to non-employment.
Criscuolo and U.K. Manufacturing and Firms that outsource are larger and more capital intensive, Leaver (2005) (2000-03) services sectors are bigger users of information and communications technology (ICT) capital, and have more international links than firms that do not outsource. The impact of outsourcing on productivity is positive but not large; a 10 percent increase in outsourcing increases total factor productivity by 0.37 percent. The effect of offshoring is caused largely by firms that are domestic and not engaged globally.
Daveri and Italy Selected
Offshoring within the same industry is beneficial for producJona-Lasinio (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) manufacturing tivity growth, but there is no observable benefit from off- (2008) shoring of services. The positive effect of offshoring on productivity is not robust to the choice of outsourcing measure; it disappears when the FH measure (described in Table 2 ) is used instead of the input-output-based measure.
Egger and EU12 Manufacturing International outsourcing has a negative marginal impact on Egger (2006) (1993-97) value added per low-skilled worker in the short run but a positive marginal impact in the longer run.
Girma and Görg
United Kingdom Selected Outsourcing may be driven by the objective to reduce cost, (2004) (1980-92) manufacturing and foreign firms are more likely to outsource than domestic firms. Outsourcing is associated with growth of both labor productivity and total factor productivity at the firm level, but foreign firms are more likely to benefit than domestic firms.
Görg and Hanley Republic of Ireland Electronics
Outsourcing can improve profitability of firms that are sub-(2004) stantially larger than the average firm size, but there is no evidence of benefit for significantly smaller firms.
Outsourcing of materials can generate significant productivity (2005) (1990-95) gains, but such gains only accrue to firms with low export intensity.
way to ensure that income levels in these economies recover to a pre-crisis level in the foreseeable future (Bhaumik, 2011) . At its heart, outsourcing involves firms specializing in activities in which they have core competence (or comparative advantage) and interfirm trade in goods and services made possible by the unbundling of the production process. 1 Hence, economic theory suggests that it should have a positive impact on firm-level productivity. 2 However, the evidence in the recent literature measuring the impact of outsourcing on productivity is somewhat mixed (Olsen, 2006) . For example, Girma and Görg (2004) find that out- sourcing in the United Kingdom, which was at least in part a cost-reducing strategy, raised productivity for some domestic manufacturing industries, especially for exporters. The greater impact of outsourcing on the productivity of exporters is also confirmed for the United States by Kurz (2006) , for Ireland by Görg, Hanley, and Strobl (2008) , and for Germany by Wagner (2011). But Criscuolo and Leaver (2005) find that in the United Kingdom most of the benefits of outsourcing accrue to firms that are not globally engaged. Similarly, Amiti and Wei (2006) find that (service) outsourcing, which does not contribute to job losses, contributes to higher total factor productivity (TFP). And Egger and Egger's (2006) study of 12 European Union countries suggests that the impact of outsourcing can change over time: It can have a negative impact on the real value added of workers in the short run, but this impact can be positive in the long run. Table 1 summarizes the key literature results on the impact of outsourcing on employment and firm performance. It is not difficult to comprehend why the benefits of outsourcing may be limited. It is well understood that firm managers have their own vested interests that have little to do with firm performance, are boundedly rational, or can underestimate the magnitude of the cost of managing the outsourcing process and the contract with the vendors relative to benefits (on account of hubris). Hence, the realized net benefits of outsourcing may be significantly lower than the expected net benefits. Barthélemy (2001) , for example, estimates that the cost of monitoring information technology vendors and the cost of bargaining and renegotiating contracts with them can be as high as 8 percent of the annual contract amount. Furthermore, it is difficult to estimate the costs of switching from in-house information technology activities to an external vendor and switching from one vendor to another. The actual cost of managing the overall outsourcing process can, therefore, be considerably higher. The marginal impact of outsourcing on firm performance might, therefore, be insignificant.
As mentioned earlier, we extend the literature on the impact of outsourcing on firm-level productivity using plant-level data from the German manufacturing sector. The choice of the country is deliberate; Germany's ability to benefit from outsourcing is not fully obvious (Farrell, 2004) . We begin by examining the extent of outsourcing in German industries and the trend in outsourcing over time. We use a number of measures for 1995, 2000, and 2005 to estimate the extent of outsourcing in German industries over time. We compare and contrast the extent of outsourcing between the manufacturing and services sectors and also among the industries within each of these sectors. Thereafter, we examine the changes in the extent of outsourcing in these industries during the 1995-2000 and 2000-2005 periods. Next, we estimate the impact of industry-level outsourcing intensity on plant-level labor productivity for 2000 and 2005. We find that (i) the extent of outsourcing is higher among manufacturing industries in Germany than among service industries and (ii) the outsourcing intensity of these industries did not change much between 1995 and 2005. We also find a significantly positive and economically meaningful impact of industry-level outsourcing intensity on plant-level labor productivity in Germany's manufacturing sector 3 for both 2000 and 2005 .
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: The next section discusses the empirical strategy and the data. In particular, we highlight the extent of (and trends in) outsourcing intensity among German industries during the 1995-2005 period. We then present the regression results on the impact of outsourcing on labor productivity. The final section presents our conclusion.
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA

Empirical Strategy
We model (log) labor productivity (Y/L) as a function of (log) capital per employee (K/L), capital quality (KQ), labor skills (LS), and a number of other plant-level control variables (included in vector Z). Finally, we add a measure of outsourcing (OSS), discussed below, to the regression specification. Our regression mode, therefore, is as follows: (1) where i refers to the ith firm and ε is the i.i.d. error term. Our empirical model, which examines the relationship between plant-level labor productivity and industry-level outsourcing intensity, is consistent with both the strand of literature that examines plant-(or firm-) level performance with country-level factors such as institutional quality (see Bhaumik et al., 2012 , for a discussion of the literature) and the strand that examines the impact of industry-level outsourcing on micro variables such as individual wage rates (Geishecker and Görg, 2008) .
We include in the vector Z controls for market competition (i.e., competition) and ownership (a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for foreign-owned plants), both of which can affect firm performance (Bhaumik and Estrin, 2007) . The average value of the Herfindahl index for the 2000 sample of industries was 87, while that for the 2005 sample was 81. Foreign-owned plants accounted for about 8 percent and 11 percent of these samples, respectively. In addition, we control for the presence of a works council in the plant. Available evidence suggests that works councils can facilitate efficient enforcement of contractual agreements between managers and workers and thereby contribute to greater productivity (Addison, Schnabel, and Wagner, 2001) . About 41 percent of the plants in the 2000 sample had works councils, and the corresponding figure for 2005 was 46 percent. We also include in the vector a control for location (a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when a plant is located in Eastern Germany) and distinguish between heavy and light industries (a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for light industries). About 30 percent of the plants in the 2000 sample and 26 percent of the plants in the 2005 sample are located in Eastern Germany.
As discussed later, we are able to use cross-sectional data for 2000 and 2005 for our estimation. In keeping with the literature, we need to consider the possibility that capital per employee, capital quality, and labor skills are endogenous. We have therefore used a two-stage instrumental variable estimation process. In the first stage, the potentially endogenous variables have been instrumented by past values of these variables and other exogenous variables such as firm age. In the second stage, labor productivity (and profitability) have been regressed on the measure of outsourcing, the instrumented values of the (potentially) endogenous variables, and the other control variables. The first-stage regressions are reported in Appendixes A2 and A3.
Measures of Outsourcing
We generate measures of outsourcing using balance of payments and input-output tables; details are reported in Table 2 . Broadly speaking, we build on the research of Feenstra and Hanson (FH, 1996, 1999) , the first measure is calculated as the share of imported intermediate inputs to total non-energy inputs. FH do not have a direct measure of imported intermediate inputs from their data and, instead, estimate import intensity using final trade data from the IMF balance of payment statistics. A useful way to think about the FH measure is the sum of the input weight times import intensity, for all inputs into production. Thus, for each industry i, FH have where for our measure all data come from the OECD. Imports and total production come from the total inputoutput table, such that each row of the column "imports" represents the total amount of each sector that is imported into the country for the given year. The important distinction is that this quantity does not equal the column sum from the import input-output table.
FH consider only material purchases by manufacturing industries from other manufacturing industries. Presumably, this approach excludes input purchases from energy-intensive industries, such as ISIC code 8-namely, coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel. By extending the analysis to all 48 ISIC industries, energy industries are included. For the sake of completeness, we calculate the FH measure two ways, both including and excluding energy input purchases in the numerator. The results remain qualitatively the same, except as expected, for the two largest industries 2 (mining and quarrying) and 8 (coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel).
FH_narrow FH also consider a narrow measure of outsourcing intensity, which consists of input purchases of goods within the same industry. This can be thought of as restricting input purchases to the diagonal of the input-output matrix. For the narrow measure of outsourcing, we do not make the distinction of energy/non-energy inputs in the numerator. A comparable comparison would be to simply exclude energy-intensive industries from consideration. where x d ij and x m ij are the domestic and imported intermediate inputs from sector i to sector j, respectively, and i excludes the energy sectors (mining and utility). The OECD ratios are expected to be slightly lower than the corresponding FH measures, since the FH measures use final data for imports and production. The final trade data also include value added from production and, hence, might overstate the importance of a given import.
OECD
OECD_narrow This is the equivalent of FH's narrow measure of outsourcing, whereby only imports from the same industry are taken into consideration. Table 3 shows the pairwise correlation among the different measures of outsourcing. With a few exceptions, the correlation coefficients are large and significant at the 10 percent level. Correlation is particularly high within wide and narrow measures of outsourcing. The observations made in the rest of this paper and the results reported should therefore not be influenced significantly by the choice of the outsourcing measure. Figure 1 shows the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (standard or wide) measures of outsourcing for German manufacturing and service industries for 1995, 2000, and 2005. 4 The extent of outsourcing is higher in manufacturing industries than in service industries. For most manufacturing industries, the measure of outsourcing is between 20 percent and 40 percent, while for most service industries it is below 20 percent. 5 Further, the outsourcing intensity in both manufacturing and service industries has remained stable since 1995, suggesting that the popular wisdom that outsourcing is on the rise in developed country industries might require further investigation.
Other Variables
Estimating the impact of industry-level outsourcing intensity on plant-level labor productivity requires plant-level data on output, employment, location, ownership, etc. To this end, we use data provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) at Nuremberg, Germany. Geishecker and Görg (GG, 2008 ) construct a measure of outsourcing intensity by focusing on imported intermediate inputs but, in contrast to FH, normalize by total industry output value. This is an attempt to reconcile the difference between offshoring and domestic outsourcing, since (as GG point out) an increase in domestic outsourcing will lower the OSS measure in the FH and OECD calculations. By including value added in the denominator, as part of total output, GG argue that an increase in industry-level domestic input purchases will be countered by a decrease in industry-level value added. Hence, the GG measure of outsourcing intensity is where X m ij represents the value of imported intermediate inputs from industry i to industry j and Y j represents the total output value of the industry of interest. Note that, in contrast to FH, GG choose to include energy purchases in the denominator.
GG
GG_narrow
This is the equivalent of FH's narrow measure of outsourcing, whereby only imports from the same industry are taken into consideration. Fischer et al., 2008) . The survey, which is the basis for a wide range of policy-related research, has two important limitations. First, because of a change in the classification system for economic activities, data are comparable for the 1993-99 period and thereafter for 2000 and the later years-hence our decision to restrict our analysis of labor productivity to 2000 and 2005. Second, the data provide information about investment flows for the years of the survey; there is no information on capital stock. Since it is stylized to use capital stock as an explanatory variable in any regression model involving labor productivity, we had to compute plant-level capital stocks using other data sources.
We experimented with two different approaches to computing plant-level values of capital stock. We first used the German KLEMS data 6 to compute industry-level capital-output ratios for 1995 and used these ratios to compute approximate values of plant-level capital stock, given data on plant-level output. We then used the data on investment flows and depreciation, and the perpetual inventory method, to compute plant-level values of capital stock for the subse- NOTE: (Log) capital per employee, quality of capital, and labor skill are instrumented. Values within parentheses are robust standard errors; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
REGRESSION RESULTS
Our regression results are reported in Table 4 . We report the regression results for 2000 and 2005 alone. As mentioned earlier, on account of a change in the classification system for economic activities, data are comparable for the 1993-99 period and thereafter for 2000 and the later years. Further, as explained in footnote 5, we use lagged values of variables to instrument potential endogenous variables, and absence of lagged values of appropriate variables limits our ability to estimate a two-stage least-squares model for 1995. For 2000 and 2005, the F-statistics suggest that the estimated models are very meaningful in the context of the data. Indeed, despite the reduced efficiency of the regressions, on account of instrumenting, most of the explanatory variables are significant at the 1 percent level. Further, the statistics for the Anderson test for underidentification and the Sargan test for overidentifying restrictions suggest that the choice of instruments was appropriate. 7 The results are also meaningful from the point of view of economic theory. They suggest that labor productivity is positively related to capital per employee and capital quality. The results indicate that the capital-per-employee elasticity of labor productivity is 0.97; that is, any increase in capital per employee results in a proportional change in labor productivity. The impact of capital quality on labor productivity is much weaker. Productivity is inversely related to market concentration; that is, it is higher in competitive markets. This is consistent with the wider literature on the impact of competition on productivity. Labor productivity is higher for firms in the light industries than those in the heavy industries. The link between works councils and productivity is not strong, but there is a significant positive relationship in 2005. This has interesting implications about the debate on the impact of labor market institutions on firm performance and is consistent with the argument that institutions that offer workers greater protection can improve productivity (Bhaumik et al., 2012) .
Most importantly, outsourcing has both a statistically significant and economically meaningful impact on labor productivity. No other variable affects labor productivity as much; the impact of outsourcing is more than 2.5 times higher than the impact of the next most important factor, namely, capital per employee. This positive relationship between outsourcing and labor productivity is consistent with the evidence in the wider literature. As highlighted in Table 1 , earlier research established a positive relationship between outsourcing and productivity (and its growth) in countries such as Ireland (Görg and Hanley, 2005) and the United Kingdom (Girma and Görg, 2004) . While the overall evidence about the impact of outsourcing on productivity remains mixed, our results strengthen the arguments that emphasize the favorable aspects of outsourcing.
To recapitulate, our regression model has (log) labor productivity (Y/L) as the dependent variable and a measure of outsourcing (OSS) that is bounded by zero and 1 as an explanatory variable. The marginal impact of outsourcing on labor productivity, therefore, is given by for 2000 and for 2005. At the mean value for labor productivity, therefore, the marginal impact of an increase in (industry level) outsourcing
Aubuchon, Bandyopadhyay, Bhaumik intensity on (plant level) labor productivity, , can be significant. This contradicts earlier findings that the marginal impact of outsourcing intensity on firm-level labor productivity is quite small (Criscuolo and Leaver, 2005 ). While it is not possible to reach strong conclusions on the impact of outsourcing on firm-level productivity based on a single empirical investigation, or indeed a handful of contradictory empirical results, our results suggest that there is scope for optimism about the beneficial aspects of outsourcing.
CONCLUSION
Outsourcing and offshoring have become increasingly volatile political issues in the developed economies of North America and Europe, in large measure on account of the rising or high and stagnant unemployment rates in these economies. Yet, the empirical literature on the impact of outsourcing on firms, while growing, is still somewhat small, and there is no consensus in this literature about the impact of outsourcing on firm performance. We extend this literature using plant-level data from the manufacturing sector in Germany, whose ability to benefit from outsourcing is not fully obvious. We find that the extent of outsourcing is higher among the manufacturing industries in Germany than among the service industries and that the outsourcing intensity of these industries did not change much between 1995 and 2005. We also find a significantly positive and economically meaningful impact of industry-level outsourcing intensity on plant-level labor productivity, for both 2000 and 2005.
Our research has certain shortcomings. We observe outsourcing intensity at the industry level rather than at the plant level, and we have a noisy measure of plant-level capital. However, our analysis provides some prima facie evidence about outsourcing intensity of German industries and the outsourcing-productivity link in Germany. It therefore provides the basis for further inquiry into the outsourcing phenomenon.
NOTES
1 The new institutional economics literature suggests that the choice between outsourcing and producing all components of the final product internally also depends on asset specificity of the intermediate products that are outsourced and the corresponding governance costs of the outsourcing contracts (Holmstrom and Roberts, 1998, and Williamson, 2002) . Grossman and Helpman (2002) argue that the transactions cost approach to outsourcing is inadequate because it treats as given the industry environment within which a firm operates. They demonstrate that the extent of outsourcing depends on the search costs that are incurred by the firms to find appropriate vendors, the relative bargaining powers of the firms deciding on outsourcing and the vendors supplying the (intermediate) goods and services, and the elasticity of demand of the (final) consumer good. However, neither of these two strands of the literature discusses the impact of outsourcing on firm performance, especially productivity.
2 The literature examines the impact of outsourcing both on firm-and plant-level productivity, and there is some indication that firm-and plant-level effects might indeed differ. We use plant-level data later in the article; however, in the discussion, we use "firm-level" and "plant-level" interchangeably.
3 To date, the majority of the economic literature has emphasized the impact of outsourcing on manufacturing firms (Olsen, 2006; Amiti and Wei, 2006; Görg and Hanley, 2005; Egger and Egger, 2006) The values within parentheses are robust standard errors; ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
